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Consumer Choice and Data Envelopment Analysis:
The Case of Discrimination on Housing Markets




The objective of this paper is twofold. First we discuss, whether data
envelopment analysis can be applied to households' consumption activities
on the basis of Kelvin Lancaster's approach to consumer choice. Then, we
apply data envelopment analysis to identify ineciencies in a subsector
of the Augsburg (Germany) housing market. These ineciencies can be
attributed to dierential treatment by landlords. With these inecien-
cies occuring systematically for certain householdtypes we conclude that
discriminatory behavior exists.
1 Introduction
Inspired by Becker's (1957 updated in 1971) neoclassical theory of discrimina-
tion various studies have been published testing for discrimination on housing-
markets.
Basically, two types of analysis can be distinguished. First, Yinger (1986),
Galster and Constantine (1991), Yinger (1991), Roychoudhury and Goodman
(1992) and Roychoudhury and Goodman (1996) employ the direct housing au-
dit technique. They perform controlled housing search experiments to directly
test for discriminatory behaviour of landlords. Second, two indirect statistical
approaches utilizing existing housing data are conducted. Kain and Quigley
(1972), McDonald (1974), Roistacher and Goodman (1976), Weinberg (1978),
Silberman, Yochum and Ihlanfeldt (1982), Haurin and Kamara (1992), Kr-
ishnan and Krotki (1993) and Bourassa (1994) used discrete choice models
to test for signicant disparities in homeownership between certain houshold
groups whereas Kain and Quigley (1970 and 1975), Lapham (1971), King and
Mieszkowsky (1973), Follain and Malpezzi (1981) and Chambers (1992) ap-
ply hedonic price estimation. They try to assess discrimination by observing
dierential prices while dening equivalent housing through Lancaster's (1966)
charakteristics approach. In these studies the characteristics approach has been

We thank the participants of the symposium 'La methode DEA et l'analyse des perfor-
mances des enterprises et des organisations' in Marseille from 26 to 28 June 1997 for their
helpful comments and stimulating remarks. Nevertheless, the usual caveats apply.
1
employed to evaluate price dierentials on identical collections of housing at-
tributes or characteristics. Our analysis of discrimination on housing markets
follows Lancaster's approach of consumer choice. On the basis of the Lancas-
terian approach we set up a rather simple model of the households' choice of
dwelling units where landlords discriminate against a certain group of potential
tenants by systematically restricting the set of dwellings they can choose from.
We show that ineciencies in consumption can be induced by landlords. In con-
trast to the above mentioned studies, only testing for price dierentials those
ineciencies are not restricted to be price dierentials for equivalent housing,
they can also mean equal price for less housing. We further show that those
ineciencies can be identied by data envelopment analysis. After measur-
ing the ineciency for a data set of 418 households, we regress the eciency
scores against variables indicating the household type. As we nd that those
variables can explain for a large proportion of the identied ineciencies we
conclude that there is systematic dierential treatment based on the household
type constituting discrimination.
So, the paper is structured as follows. In the second section we discuss
the landlords' options to discriminate. Applying Lancaster's characteristics
approach to model the houshold's choice in section three allows us to see, how
discriminatory action by landlords aects the choice. In the section four we
assert that a discriminatory landlord may induce inecient decisions by the
households. After presenting the data in the following section, we identify
the ineciencies by data envelopment analysis and explain them by regression
analysis in section six. A conclusion is provided in section seven.
2 Discriminatory action
Becker denes discrimination in terms of a price dierential for equivalent hous-
ing, that is, if "some people pay more than others for a dwelling of a given
quality" (Becker 1971, p. 78) discrimination occurs.
For our analysis we want to adopt a more general view on discrimination.
An action taken by one party that negatively aects a second party is seen
as being discriminatory, if it is based on personal characteristics of the sec-
ond party (Black et. al. 1978). Additionally, Turner (1992) objects that not
any dierential treatment is discriminatory, rather is it systematic dierential
treatment that constitutes discrimination.
Although housholds are often comprised of several members, we assume
that dwelling decisions are made by the household head. So the household is
generally seen as one decision making unit, that is characterized by the type of
the income earning member. The other party is denoted landlord, not distin-
guishing whether he or she is the owner of the property or a realtor acting on
behalf of the owner.
1
Stahl (1985) with reference to Stigler (1961) points out that conditions in
housing marktes are such, that landlords possess a certain degree of monopoly
1
Without further mentioning it, we restrict our discussion on rented dwelling units only.
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power, allowing them to discriminate households. The majority of the traded
dwelling units are advertised in newspapers. As rents and expenses for utilities
are revealed in this ads, landlords basically cannot earn a higher rent from
tenants of discriminated groups. Hence a price dierential due to exploiting a
lower price elasticity of demand for housing of a certain group is not created.
2
Rather, landlords discriminate via exclusionary tactics. This exclusionary
treatment by landlords may include denying the availability of vacant dwellings
to a potential tenant on the basis of personal characteristics as well as delaying
further information on the appartment in question. Empirical results of Gal-
ster and Constantine (1991), Yinger (1991), and Turner (1992) show that, for
the United States, exclusionary treatment is the major discriminatory tactic
employed by agents.
3
So, discrimination amounts to systematically not oering available dwelling
units to members of a certain group.
3 Consumer choice
Modeling the consumer choice with reference to Lancaster (1966, 1971 and 1991)
is based on the assumption that households do not directly derive utility from
the consumption of goods, but from bundles of objective properties associated
with goods, here dwelling units. Lancaster uses the term characteristics for
these properties. Dwelling unit j (j = 1; : : : ; n) possesses b
ij
(i = 1; : : : ; r) units
of characteristic i. The quantities of the i-th characteristic and the j-th dwelling
X
j
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; in
matrix notation z = Bx, where z is the r-dimensional vector of characteristics
and x is the n-dimensional vector of dwellings. The r  n matrix B is the




is the fraction of the i-th dwelling that is consumed by a household,








So preferences refer to characteristics, whereas the budget constraint is on
dwellings. G = fxjpx  k; x  0;
~
1x = 1g is the budget set in goods (dwellings)
space, where p denotes the n-dimensional vector of dwelling prices
5
and k is
the total expenditure a household decided to spend on housing. The budget
set's image in characteristics space is K = fzjz = Bx; px  k; x  0;
~
1x = 1g.
Goodman (1989) and Goodman (1988) nd a strong dependence of the
2
Courant (1978) points out, that this lower elasticity could be caused simply by a house-
hold's fear to be discriminated against.
3
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The term price is used throughout the discussion, although rent would be more appropriate
in the context of rented property.
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expenditure on housing and the permanent income of a household. So it can be
reasonably assumed that k is independent of the dwelling decision itself, and it
is therefore exogenous to the model.
The choice is modeled in two distinct steps, reecting the separation of the
two decision spaces.
3.1 First Step
In the rst step of the consumption decision the household chooses, subject
to the budget constraint, its utility maximizing characteristics bundle. The
optimization step is performed in characteristics space.
maxu(z)
s.t. z 2 K (1)
Lancaster's assumptions on preferences (see Lancaster 1971, pp. 20) secure
that a solution z

to problem (1) exists.
3.2 Second Step
The rst step determines which bundle of characteristics is a utility maximizing
one for the household. In the second step of the decision the household chooses
that combination of dwellings, which supplies z

at minimum cost. This opti-
mization step is performed in dwellings (goods-) space.
The household consumes the dwelling bundle x

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
; px  k; x  0;
~
1x = 1g (2)
J contains all dwelling expenses p = px, that make z

attainable.
We dene the expenditure correspondence L(z

) to be the set of all expenses





) = fpjp = px; z

 Bx; x  0;
~
1x = 1g (3)
A complete decomposition of L(z







































) = fpjp = px; z

< Bx; px > k; x  0;
~





) = fpjp = px; z

= Bx; px > k; x  0;
~





) = fpjp = px; z

< Bx; px = k; x  0;
~






) = fpjp = px; z

= Bx; px = k; x  0;
~





) = fpjp = px; z

< Bx; px < k; x  0;
~





) = fpjp = px; z

= Bx; px < k; x  0;
~
1x = 1g (10)
reveals the following properties of the subsets:






























), then there exists a collection of dwellings x
0
which maps into
a characteristics bundle z
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1x = 1. So z
0
is an element of K in characteristics space. This
leads to a contradiction with z

still being the solution of (1).








) and p  k for p 2 J .
Hence, the minimum of J(z
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) being dened in (3) (11)
From all dwelling collections supplying at least z

, the household chooses
that one, which minimizes the housing expenditure. The budget constraint is
obeyed by virtue of problem (1).
4 Ineciencies in Consumption
4.1 Sources of ineciency
The household's decision crucially depends on the consumption technology a
household regards as binding. The decision of the household is ecient with
respect to this consumption technology. A bundle of characteristics is ecient,
if there exists no other bundle, attainable at a less or equal price, that possesses
more of some characteristic and not less of others. A collection of dwellings is
ecient, if it supplies an ecient characteristic bundle at minimum cost.
If any household faced an identical consumption technology no inecient
collections are traded on the market.
But as information on available dwellings may vary across households con-
sumption technologies that housholds face may dier. The landlords' dieren-
tial behavior is the only source for diering information concerning the con-
sumption technology. We assume that the severity of the dwelling decision
induces the household to process the available information rationally.
6
6
For home buyers Turnbull and Sirmans (1993) could not nd dierences in perfomance
between rst-time versus repeat buyers and between out-of-town versus in-town buyers, which
supports our assumption.
5
Although the household's decision may be ecient from the individual tech-
nology's point of view, it may be inecient under a global perspective.
Concerning the ineciencies we can distinguish the following four cases:
1. We may nd dwelling units, that comply with the above denition of
eciency. They supply an ecient bundle of characteristics at minimum
cost.
2. If we nd a household consuming a dwelling unit X
m
7
at a price p
m
larger than the price p
l







, we can conclude that X
l
could not have
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cannot be the solution to the problem (11).





too expensive. The source of the ineciency is found in step two of the
consumption decision.
3. Now suppose a dwelling unit X
l
supplies a characteristics bundle z
l
that
is larger in at least one component and equal in all others than the charac-
teristics bundle z
m
of another dwelling X
m
. Both dwellings are available






2 K and z
l
2 K with
K = fzjz = Bx; px  k; x  0;
~
1x = 1g, where k is the total expendi-
ture the household consuming X
m
decided to spend on housing. Clearly
p
m
 k and p
l
 k. As z
l
oers more of at least one characteristic than z
m





) and therefore z
m
cannot be the solution to (1).




; : : : ; x
m
; : : : ; x
n
) =
(0; : : : ; 0; 1; 0; : : : ; 0) associated with the consumption of dwelling X
l
is
not in the consumption technology that the household consuming X
m
re-
gards as binding for itself. Thus X
l
is not oered to the household and
the source of the ineciency is found in the rst step of the consumption
decision.




leads to a loss of utility.






oers less of at least one characteristic and
not more of all others compared to a dwelling X
l
. This dwelling X
l
could
not have been available for the household renting X
m
. The reasoning of
the above cases 2. and 3. applies simultaneously.
Dwelling unit X
m
is too expensive relative to the unit X
l
. Furthermore,
the household consuming X
m
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) = (0; : : : ; 1; : : : ; 0).
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In the cases 2. to 4. we assumed implicitly that the unit of comparison
denoted a single dwelling unit X
l
. The comparisons hold true for a collection
of dwellings which obeys the constraint
~
1x = 1. The unit of comparison can be
a convex combination of real dwelling units.
One might doubt that such a compound dwelling serves as an appropriate
unit for comparison. It can be argued, however, assuming equal distribution
of power between a potential tenant and a landlord, a bargaining process can
be induced by one of the parties to reduce the rental price p
m
to a level where
eciency substitution comes into eect.
8
In this context a compound dwelling
unit indicates that a point exists, where eciency substitution comes into eect.
This compound dwelling unit is a convex combination of existing dwelling units,
that is not necessarily existing. So we can speak of a virtual dwelling unit that
can be created by a sucient reduction of the price of the unit Xm.
4.2 Detecting ineciency
We assume all dwelling units, traded on a local market at time of the household
decision, to be the consumption technology, a household ideally could have
choosen from. So the (piecewise linear) expenditure correspondence
L(z) = fpjp = px; z  Bx; x  0;
~
1x = 1g (12)
where B incorporates all traded dwelling units, describes the (consumption-
) technological relationship between the expenditure p and the characteristics
bundle z. As noted above the expenditure correspondence contains all ex-
penditures that allow to attain at least the characteristics bundle z. Relative
ineciencies will be measured against the reference technology represented by
L(z). Farell (1957) denes an input measure of technical eciency by
TE(p; z) = minfj  p 2 L(z)g (13)
where L(z) is given by equation (12). This measure of eciency can be































The subscript '0' denotes variables associated with the analyzed dwelling
unit.
Note the following points:
8
Eciency substitution simply means, that a sucient reduction in price can cause e-
ciency for any good. Households will substitute into that commodity as soon as it is ecient.
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1. In the terminology of a production problem here we have a one-input
multi-output problem. The rent p can be interpreted as an one-dimensional
input that generates an r-dimensional output of z.
2. As there is only one input variable, it follows that any excess input is
captured by the proportional reduction of the rental price. Hence any
excess input, typically denoted by s
 
, is excluded from the model.
3. By virtue of the employed model, the input is measured in monetary
units exclusively. One could argue that the quality of the dwelling deci-
sion strongly depends on real inputs, like e.g. time used for search. As
Lancaster's simple model does not allow for real inputs we want to conne
our analysis to the monetary input only. An analysis that includes the
time used for search might be possible under a two stage model which, in
contrast to the simple model, accounts for several activities.
In order to get a one-dimensional measure of total ineciency under the
presence of positive slacks s
+
, Ali and Lerme (1990) introduce the eciency
measure  that incorporates both proportional reduction and slacks.





alently  = 1. Consequently, a reduction of the price p
0
to the level of  and
removal of the slacks s
+
can achieve eciency for the analyzed dwelling.
Under the presence of positive slacks s
+
this way of achieving eciency
is quite dierent compared to the above mentioned reduction of the price to
induce eciency substitution. Until the price reaches the level  relative to the
initial level, both procedures are equal. Once this level is reached, eciency
substitution calls for further reduction of the price to make the unit ecient,
whereas the procedure here calls for a removal of slacks. Furthermore the
latter procedure accepts the current frontier as it is and moves the unit onto it,
whereas any further reduction of the price generates a new frontier.
9
4.3 Eciency scores and consequences for the household
As discussed in section 4.1, four categories of eciency can be distinguished. It
can be seen from Table 1, how these categories relate to the eciency scores 
and  .
5 Data
For the analysis we use data from the housing market in Lechhausen, which is
a municipal district of Augsburg, Germany. Data are taken from the dataset of
9
Although this is to be considered rather problematic in the case of a production frontier
(because we do not know these techniques), in our case a further reduction of the 'input' poses
no diculty in interpretation.
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Table 1: Eciency scores and the consequences
  slacks consequences compared
to reference unit
case
 = 1  = 1 no slacks ecient 1.
 = 1  <1 slacks inecient: loss of utility 3.
 < 1  =  no slacks inecient: expenditure
to high;
2.
 < 1  <  slacks inecient: expendiure




The data record the monthly rent and the dwelling charac-
teristics as well as personal characteristics of the household head. Also the data
set indicates the year, the household moved into the dwelling. We restrict our
analysis on dwelling units where moves occured in 1987. As the target date for
the census was May 25th 1987, those ats must have been traded in the rst
half of the year. So the requirement is met, that the dwellings, which compose
the reference consumption technology, must have been traded at approximately
the same time.
The data set records 420 households, that moved in 1987. By close inspec-
tion of the data set two dwellings were identied containing implausible data.
Those records were excluded from the data set, leaving a total of 418 dwellings
for the analysis.
5.1 Variables in the analysis
The variables included in the analysis are displayed in table 2. Dwelling char-
acteristics were available both in cardinal and ordinal scale.
SIZE and ROOMS represent the cardinal characteristics, whereas the ordinal
quality of the dwelling is captured by YEARBLT, BATH, TOILET, HEATING, FUEL
and KITCHEN. For the incorporation of YEARBLT we assume that the quality of
a dwelling depends on its vintage; quality decreases with age. The composition
of the intervals reects the structure of the data recorded in the dataset. For
HEATING we assume that the quality of a heating facility decreases with the
care required by the household. A stove in every room (HEATING=1) requires
more care by the household than central heating, that serves only the analyzed
dwelling (HEATING=2). This, however requires more care than central heating
(HEATING=3) . And so forth. Ranking the FUEL, we account for convenience of
the fuel supply only if the heating consists of stoves or central heating for one
appartment only. Coal (FUEL=0) has to be supplied manually by the household,
whereas oil (FUEL=1) and gas (FUEL=2) are supplied automatically. Concerning
10
We thank the Stadt Augsburg, especially the Amt fur Statistik und Stadtentwicklung for
kindly making the data available.
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Table 2: Variables for DEA
Variable value label
RENT Rent for the dwelling unit, including utilities, in DM
SIZE Size of the dwelling unit in m
2
ROOMS Number of rooms larger than 6m
2






BATH 1= Dwelling has a bathroom
0= else
TOILET 1= Dwelling has a separate toilet
0= else
HEATING Type of heating
1= Stove
2= Central heating serving one dwelling unit
3= Central heating
4= District heating





4= District or central heating
KITCHEN 2= Kitchen in dwelling
1= Dwelling contains a kitchenette
0= else
10
the smell caused by the fuel, gas is less bothering. Electricity (FUEL=3) is the
most convenient for the household.
The above assumptions are in accordance with the common perception of
housing quality (Haussermann and Siebel, 1996).
Unfortunately, the data lacks any information on other characteristics that
may be relevant to the household's decision; such as information on the layout
of the dwelling, available balcony or terrace, carpeting, etc.
5.2 Ordinal data and DEA
For an appropriate description of the dwelling characteristics we have to include
both cardinal and ordinal variables in the data envelopment analysis.
Various suggestions have been made to incorporate ordinal data into the
CCR model (Cook, Kress and Seiford, 1996 and 1993) and into the BCC model
(Banker and Morey 1986, Kamakura 1988, Rousseau and Semple 1993). For an
input oriented model all the proposed procedures handle either ordinal input
or both ordinal input and output variables. In these models for any of the
t ordinal variables a q-dimensional vector of dichotomous dummy variables is
added, where q denotes the number of values an ordinal variable can take. So,
the number of variables in the analysis is enhanced by t (q 1) variables. Every
rank position for any ordinal variable is treated as a seperate input or output,
respectively. Vassiloglu and Giorkas (1990) suggest that there be twice as much
units as there are variables. Therefore the increased number of variables may
cause problems when the number of analyzed units is small (see Table 3).
Our setup shows the convenient property, that we have ordinal variables
only on the output side and that we have only one input variable in an input
oriented model. This allows us to handle the ordinal output variables as if they
were cardinal. Only the interpretation of the results has to adopt accordingly.
In equation (15) z denotes the vector of cardinal characteristics and B the
consumption technology matrix. The ordinal characteristics' vector is z
t
and
the consumption technology matrix of the ordinal factors is B
t
. The categories
are coded by integer values, where a larger value means a preferred category





stand for the cardinal slacks and the ordinal slacks.










































The inclusion of ordinal variables causes { in contrast to problem (14) { a
formulation basically calling for three steps to achieve eciency.
1. It still holds true that the price has to be reduced to  of the initial level
as a rst step for a unit to become ecient.
2. If positive slacks s
+
of the cardinal variables are recorded, these slacks
have to be removed. Whether this can be achieved, is only a question of
divisibility of the characteristics.
11
3. Under the presence of positive slacks s
+
t
for the ordinal characteristics, it
makes no sense to call for a removal of the slacks, if it yields a non-integer
value, that has no meaning in the realm of an ordinal scale. Rather it
follows that if a positive slack in the ordinal variable occurs, at least one
unit of the composed reference unit contains a better value of this variable.
To achieve eciency for the unit in question, additionally to the removal
of the cardinal slacks one has to lower the price of the unit further than
.
6 Results
As there is legal regulation on rents for dwelling units, which were built with
public subsidies, we have to perform the DEA on two subgoups: publicly sub-
sidized and freely nanced dwelling units.
Locational eects such as neighbourhood quality etc. inuence the rent. We
control for these eects by partitioning our analysis due to three census tracts,
that compose the area of the analyzed locality, assuming that those locational
eects do not vary tremendously within the tracts. So, publicly subsidized
(freely nanced) dwelling units from one census tract were only compared to
publicly subsidized (freely nanced) units from the same area.
Table 3 shows the distribution of the 418 dwelling units.
11
It is a dierent issue, whether it is generally possible to remove slacks in the context of
housing characteristics, that are actually seen as being xed in the short run.
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Table 3: Distribution of dwellings
Publicly
subsidized
Census tract no yes
no. 25 120 19
no. 26 105 25
no. 27 107 42
6.1 Results of the DEA computation
Model (15) has been solved for the 418 dwelling units in the six partitions. In a
rst step we want to discuss the results of the models. For the discussion we do
not distinguish between the six partitions, rather we concentrate on the whole
418 dwelling units.
The mean for the eciency scores  is 0.8119 and for  it is 0.8054, the
standard deviation is 0.20. The minimum result for  is 0.2700 and for  it is
0.2697. As displayed in table 4 about 32.1% of all 418 analyzed units, that is
134 units, were scored  = 1; 30.9% were rendered ecient with  = 1.
Table 4: Eciency scores and ineciency categories
number of
  slacks dwellings percentage
 = 1  = 1 no slacks 129 30.9
 = 1  <1 slacks 5 1.2
 < 1  =  no slacks 32 7.7
 < 1  <  slacks 252 60.3
The distribution of the eciency scores  and  are displayed in Table 5.
Observing the distribution of the slacks for the ordinal variables in Table
6 one can assert that most dwelling units were compared to reference units of
approximately the same ordinal quality. Especially, concerning YEARBLT, more
than 70% of all units were compared to reference units built in the same decade,
more than 90% did not dier more than one decade. Over 90% of the units
were compared to units of an equal provision of toilet, bathroom and kitchen
and more than 70% were compared to units of equivalent heating facilities.
About 38.5% of all units have no positive component in their vector of
slacks. This means 161 units showed a  eciency score that was equal to the
12
This means for expample, that 10 percent of all dwelling units have a  smaller than 0.478
and that 20 percent of all dwellings have a  smaller 0.625.
13














Table 6: Distribution of ordinal slacks
value of the cardinal
slacks
value of the ordinal slacks
Percentile SIZE ROOMS YEARBLT BATH TOILET HEATING FUEL KITCHEN
10.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
20.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
30.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
40.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
50.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
60.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
70.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
80.00 1.000 0.172 0.384 0.000 0.000 0.202 0.676 0.000
90.00 7.000 0.500 1.003 0.000 0.000 0.741 1.330 0.000
Mean 1.59 0.12 0.27 0.01 0.01 0.16 0.31 0.07
14
 score. Only three units revealed a total of ve variables with positive slacks
relative to the reference unit (see Table 7).












6.2 Explaining the ineciency
Discrimination was dened in section 1 as systematic dierential treatment.
Due to the decision model, the computed ineciencies were caused by landlords,
who withheld dwelling units from certain households.
Certainly, a household would never have the opportunity to choose from the
whole range of appartments represented by the consumption technology. Addi-
tionally, certain ineciencies on housing market are inevitable, as the landlords
cannot adapt to shortrun changes in demand. But, on a housing market where
there is no discriminatory behavior, one would expect to nd the ineciencies
being equally distributed among the various household types.
Now, we want to test, whether the dierential treatment systematically
depends on personal characteristics of the households. If we nd a statistically
signicant relationship, we can reject the hypothesis, that the ineciencies and
therefore the treatment is independent of the personal household characteristics.
One way of nding such a systematic relationship is to interpret the e-
ciency scores as the dependent variable that is determined by independent per-
sonal household characteristics. Let 
q
denote the eciency score of a dwelling,
inhabited by household q, (q = 1; : : : ; n), and the type of the household can be
described by the v-dimensional vector of personal characteristics y
q
.





; ) + e
q
; q = 1; : : : ; n (16)
where e
q
denotes an error term and  denotes the parameter vector to be
estimated. For estimation, a priori knowledge about the functional form of f(:)
has to be supplied. Often a linear relationship is assumed. Analogously the 
score could be regressed.
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Certain properties of the eciency scores computed by DEAmodels like (15)
pose serious problems on linear OLS regression models (Holvad and Hougaard
1993; Lovell, Walters and Wood 1994).
We want to impose a transformation on the eciency scores as to reect

























takes the value 1, if no reduction of the price is necessary to estab-




takes the value 0, if slacks have to be
removed in order to achieve eciency for the unit. Hence, all four eciency cat-
egories can be represented by the two transformed variables. How the variables
relate to the eciency categories can be seen from Table 8.






As the dependent variables are dichotomous variables after the transforma-
tion, we apply a logistic regression instead of the linear OLS regression.
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The logistic regression model can be formulated as:
Pr(







where y is the v+1-dimensional vector of personal household characteristics,
that includes y
0


















Analogous to equatios (19) and (20) a regression model can be established
for the second eciency score :
Pr( = 1jy) = F (y) (22)
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and in (22) and (23) it estimates that of 
q




The personal household characteristics that we include in the logistic re-
gression are household size, presence of dependent children in the household,
and nationality, gender, age, educational level
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of the household head, as well
as information on whether or not the household was a single parent household
(see Table 9).
Additionally, a variable has been included to indicate public subsidies for
the dwelling. As can be seen from Table 3, the number of units analyzed in
any partition of the sector of freely nanced dwellings is signicantly higher
than in the sector of publicly subsidized dwelling units. Therefore, the propor-
tion of ecient units is signicantly higher among subsidized dwellings. The
variable PUBLSUB is included to capture indirect eects caused by the diering
proportions of ecient units.
If gender discrimination existed, one would expect the variables that indicat-
ing the gender of the household head to have a negative sign, signicantly dier-
ent from zero. If discrimination of Non-German headed households existed, one
would anticipate a positive sign for the nationality variable. A negative sign
for the age variables would also indicate discrimination of the corresponding
groups.
6.3 Result of the logistic regression
6.3.1

 as the dependent variable
Table 10 reports the regression results explaining the transformed DEA e-
ciency score

. The regression of the computed and transformed DEA scores
against ten variables, characterizing the household, succeeds in explaining a
signicant portion of the ineciency.
To test for 
i
= 0, we employ the Wald statistic, which is 
2
-distributed
under the null-hypothesis. The corresponding degrees of freedom are displayed
in column 'df' and the level of signicance in column 'Sig.'.
15
The variable indicating a household head, younger than 30 years, is negative
and signicant at  = 0:05. The education variable as well as the nationality
variable are positive and signicant, also at the  = 0:05 level.
14
Unfortunately the data set did not supply any data on the household's income. We tried
to include data on the occupation of the household head as a proxy for income. But as about
25% of this data was 'missing value', we included a variable indicating the educational level
of the household, as a rough proxy for the occupation and therefore for income situation of
the household.
15
For one degree of freedom, the Wald statistic is the squared quotient of the estimated
parameter and its standard error.
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Table 9: Variables for the logistic regression
variable value meaning
AGE L 30 1 = Household head younger than 30 years
0 = else
AGE G 50 1 = Houshold head older than 50
0 = else
EDUC HI 1 = High educational level, household head nished
middle school or grammar school
0 = else
CPLNOKI 1 = Couple, no dependent children
0 = else
CPLWIKI 1 = Couple with dependent children
0 = else
FEMNOKI 1 = Single woman, no dependent children
0 = else
FEMWIKI 1 = Single woman with dependent children
0 = else
MALENOKI 1 = Single man, no dependent children
0 = else
NATIONAL 1 = Household head is of german nationality
0 = else
NUPEOP 1-9 = Number of people in household
PUBLSUB 1 = Dwelling was publicly subsidized
0 = else
THETAEFF Transformed eciency score


IOTAEFF Transformed eciency score 
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Table 10: Results of the logistic regression (dependent variable: THETAEFF)
Variable  S.E Wald df Sig.
AGE L 30 -0.5801 0.2610 4.9410 1 0.0262
AGE G 50 -0.4093 0,3744 1.1955 1 0.2742
EDUC HI 0.6111 0.2377 6.6105 1 0.0101
CPLWIKI -0.0631 0.4228 0.0223 1 0.8813
FEMNOKI -0.1631 0.3520 0.2146 1 0.6432
FEMWIKI -0.3201 0.6078 0.2774 1 0.5984
MALENOKI 0.3121 0.3342 0.8722 1 0.3503
NATIONAL 0.8312 0.3629 5.2453 1 0.0220
NUPEOP 0.2221 0.1537 2.0871 1 0.1485
PUBLSUB 0.8484 0.2773 9.3587 1 0.0022
Constant -1.9489 0.5670 11.8158 1 0.0006
Concerning the household age, this result means that households with a
household head under 30, are more likely to pay more for their dwelling units
than others. Taking the educational variable as a proxy for the income, one can
assert, that with increasing income the probability of an ecient decision rises.
With respect to the nationality of the household head we can conclude that
German headed households are more likely to come to an overall ecient deci-
sion than others. So households with heads of other than German nationality
have a greater probability of renting too expensive.
As expected, the variable for public subsidies is positive and highly sigicant.
Taking a closer look at the results for the nationality variable rises the
question, whether the obtained results are articially created by neglection of
the magnitude of the ineciency through the transformation in equation (17).
So we want to further examine the results of the data envelopment computations
in two directions.
First, we observe the distribution of the original eciency scores  for both
groups of households; German headed households and others. If the distribution
of the latter is shifted left relative to the German headed households, we can
conclude that Non-German households tend to have a smaller  than German
headed ones. Since it can not be reasonably assumed, that the eciency scores
show a normal distribution, instead of a t-test we employ the non-parametric
Wilcoxon rank sum test to test for identity of the distributions. The test shows
that the distribution of  in the group NATIONAL=0 is signicantly ( = 0:05)
shifted left relative to the distribution in the group NATIONAL=1 (Wilcoxon rank
sum W=10724; Z=-2.1676).
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Second, we want to analyze the composition of the reference units.
16
Qualitatively, the same holds true for the distribution of  in the groups indicated by the
age variable and the education variable. Not signicantly for the education variable, though.
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About 89% of the ecient units are inhabited by German headed house-
holds. If all inecient units were placed randomly under the frontier, one would
expect to nd the same proportion of German headed households in the refer-
ence sets.
Let the reference index set R(i) contain all indexes of the dwelling units in
the reference set of unit i. Then the mean weighted
17
sum of German households














is the characteristic of household j, that is 1 for a German house-
hold head and 0 otherwise; D contains the indexes of all units, that are chosen
for aggregation and jDj denotes the number of elements in D.
If D contains all 284 dwelling units, whose -score is less than one, then
  is 0.9404, which signicantly diers (with  = 0:005) from the expected
value of 0.89. So we nd more German headed households in the reference sets
than expected. Thus German headed households tend to dominate the units
more often. With D constisting of the indexes of only the German headed
households the underrepresentation of Non-German households in the reference
sets is revealed by   being 0.9397.   = 0:9441 is obtained by only taking account
of the Non-German households.
The interpretation of this result is, that the reference sets of the units with
 < 1 consists of about 94% of German headed households and of about 6% of
Non-German headed households. This shows that ineciency is more severe for
Non-German headed households than the sheer percentage of 11% of ecient
Non-German households relative to 14.4% of Non-German households in the
sample might suggest.
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6.3.2  as the dependent variable
The overall results, displayed in Table 11, does not dier tremendously from
the results obtained by regressing

. Only the variable indicating the age under
30 looses signicance. This result is an expected one because as Table 6 and
Table 7 show, slacks are not a major determinant for the overall ineciency .
A striking result of this regression is that the household size variable turns
out to be positive and signicant. But a positive correlation coecient of the
number of rooms and the size of the household shows that, not surprisingly,
larger families tend to rent larger dwelling units. So the positive sign of the
parameter estimated for the household size variable can be due to the fact that
there are less large dwellings relative to small dwellings. Hence the proportion
of ecient (=1) dwellings is larger among large units.
17




The distribution of the characteristics of the units with  = 1, shows, that the units are
quite homogenously distributed on the frontier. So large facets spanned by only a few units,
are not the cause for this result.
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Table 11: Results of the logistic regression (dependent variable: IOTAEFF)
Variable  S.E Wald df Sig.
AGE L 30 -0.3546 0.2574 1.8982 1 0.1683
AGE G 50 -0.0206 0,3663 1.0032 1 0.9551
EDUC HI 0.6881 0.2321 8.7911 1 0.0030
CPLWIKI -0.0968 0.4327 0.0501 1 0.8230
FEMNOKI 0.2307 0.3548 0.4229 1 0.5155
FEMWIKI -6686 0.6129 1.1902 1 0.2753
MALENOKI 0.4122 0.3432 1.4430 1 0.2296
NATIONAL 0.8243 0.3515 5.4995 1 0.0190
NUPEOP 0.4519 0.1778 6.4570 1 0.0111
PUBLSUB 0.9052 0.2777 10.6262 1 0.0011
Constant -2.3874 0.5951 16.0922 1 0.0001
We excluded all dwellings larger than three rooms and ran the regression
again. The results basically conrm the ndings obtained for the whole sample
in sign and magnitude of the estimated parameters, not sigicantly for the
household size, though.
7 Conclusion
In the previous sections we argued that ineciencies in consumption of dwelling
units can be induced by landlords' behavior. We identied ineciencies by
employing a data envelopment analysis on housing market data.
Section 6.3.1 and section 6.3.2 showed that personal household character-
istics have a certain explanatory power concerning ineciencies. So we can
reject the hypothesis that ineciency is not systematically inuenced by per-
sonal household characteristics. A large part of ineciency can be attributed
to personal household characteristics and so can dierential treatment, caus-
ing the ineciency. Hence, we can conclude that the dierential treatment is
discriminatory in the above sense.
Households with a Non-German, low-income or young household head were
found to be subject to discriminatory dierential treatment by landlords. Fur-
ther, we can assert that the consequences of discriminatory behaviour are higher
rents for the discriminated group rather than a direct loss of utility. Discrimi-
natory behaviour is more likely to inuence the second step of the Lancasterian
consumption decision than the rst step.
21
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